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APPLYING PESTICIDES: TOWARD
RECONCEPTUALIZING LIABILITY TO NEIGHBORS
FOR CROP, LIVESTOCK AND PERSONAL
DAMAGES FROM AGRICULTURAL
CHEMICAL DRIFT
ROBERT F. BLOMQUIST*

L Background
The legacy of agricultural use of pesticide technologies in the United States is
a mixed blessing.' On the one hand, "[tihere is no question that the productivity

*

Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. B.S., 1973, University of Pennsylvania
(Wharton School); J.D., 1977, Cornell Law School. My thanks go to my research assistant, Mark
Thomburg, for his hard work and insightful advice. The research and writing of this Article was
conducted pursuant to a research grant funded by Valparaiso University School of Law. Another version
of this Article was presented at the American Agricultural Law Association's 16th Annual Educational
Conference in Kansas City, Missouri in November 1995. Copyright © 1995, Robert F. Blomquist.
1. See generally WILUAM H. RODGERS, JR., 3 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: PESTICIDES AND Toxic
SUBsTANCES 322 (1988) [hereinafter PEsTICIDEs AND Toxic SUBSTANCES]. For pertinent federal
statutory definitions, see 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1995) (definition of "pesticide"); § 136(0 (defining
"defoliant"); § 136(t) (defining "pest"). See also 40 C.F.R. § 152.3(5) (1995) (defining pesticides and
classes of pesticides); § 152.15 (defining EPA Administrator's regulatory definition of the term "pest").
Professor Rodgers has described, in poignant prose worthy of full quotation, the ethical dimensions of
pervasive societal use of pesticides:
While pollution is chiefly a subject of the unintended consequences of technological
undertakings, pesticides are unequivocally designed to disrupt, defeat, or destroy nature's
choice. That the essence of the exercise is to pollute purposefully is underscored by
historical pesticide practices that celebrated the dissemination of crude and notorious
poisons. Of course, the destroy-by-design feature of pesticides practices does not foreclose
the behavior as a matter of social choice; in legal parlance, the decision to apply
pesticides could be considered excused or justified by overriding social considerations.
But characterizing applications of pesticides as instances of excused pollution underscores
the stark zero-sum features of the behavior where gains are secured only at the expense
of environmental incursions explicitly approved. The popular nonzero-sum perception of
pollution cleanup (the company can continue to operate while the rest of us enjoy clean
water) does not hold for acts of excused pollution.
That the pesticide laws endorse direct attacks on living things that are customarily the
beneficiaries of the environmental laws is underscored by the prominent definitions. A
"pesticide" [by federal statutory definition] is a substance used to cause the death or
control the growth of nonhuman animals or plants. The generic term "pesticide" typically
is subdivided further by reference to classes of intended targets or methods of operation amphibian and reptile poisons, antimicrobial agents, attractants (designed to draw animals
into traps), bird poisons, defoliants, desiccants (plant drying agents), fish poisons,
fungicides, herbicides, insecticides, invertebrate animal poisons, mammal poisons and

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1995

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:393

of American agriculture is due in large part to the success of modern pesticides."2
Indeed, between 1950 and 1987 total output of crops and livestock nearly doubled increasing by eighty percent? The cornucopia of goods produced by American
farmers has, in turn, helped to feed the world 4 On the other hand, extensive use
of pesticides has created what William H. Rodgers, Jr. has labeled "pervasive
spillovers"'5 - a classic tragedy of the commons dilemma' involving a "pervasive impact on nontarget organisms and the environment," coupled with a
qualitative and quantitative evolutionary resistance, over time, by target organisms
to agricultural chemicals.7
repellents, nematicides (hookworms), plant regulators, rodenticides, and slimicides.
A "pest" covers virtually any form of plant or animal life declared by the Administrator
of the EPA to be "injurious to health or the environment." In an ironic and striking
turnaround, the Administrator has chosen not to compile a list of known pests, but to
declare virtually every living thing a pest when it exists under circumstances "that make
it deleterious to man or the environment." Qualifying target organisms thus include dogs,
cats, songbirds, elephants, skunks, rabbits, earthworms, and anything else nominated as
a "pest" by human constituency. Since a substance aimed at virtually any living target
satisfies the "pesticide" requirement, the inquiry and the registration process is confined
to the questions of whether the product works and estimates of the toll that will be taken
on nontarget organisms.
Understandably, an Act of Congress that pits humans against all other species ("the
pests") is taking sides on issues of environmental ethics that long have been debated. [The
prevailing] school of thought... perceives nature as something to be attacked, dominated,
controlled, and rexuced to the service of humans. This view finds comfort, for example,
in the destruction by rhotanone of millions of "junk" fish in lakes to make room for
preferred species. This is the view endorsed by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act, that perceives nature as the enemy.
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 394-96 (2d ed. 1994) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW]; see also CHRISTOPHER J. BoSSo, PESTICIDES AND POLITICS xii (1987) (stating
that pesticide regulation differs from other environmental regulation since chemical pesticides are created
intentionally).
2. JOHN M. JOHNSON & GEORGE W. WARE, PESTICIDE LITIGATION MANUAL 1-1 (1993) (endnote
omitted) [hereinafter PESTICIDE MANUAL]. See infra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (describing
"pervasive spillovers" of pesticide use and questionable production gains per input of agricultural
chemicals).
3. BARRY COMMONE:R, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET 85 (1990).
4. See, e.g., 1995 ,RITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR 90-100 (Charles P. Trumbull ed., 1995)
(providing agricultural statistics illustrating American preeminence in the production and trade of
agricultural commodities).
5. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 1, at 397.
6. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968) (reprinted
in ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 29-30 (4th ed. 1995) ("Each man
is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit in a world that is limited.").
7. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 1, at 397. As explained by Rodgers:
Mhe normal pattern of pesticide use on the farm is a broadscale application where a tiny
fraction (perhaps 1 percent?) reaches the target species to work its intended effect. This
practice has a vast spillover aptitude strongly suggesting chemical pesticide success stories
are necessarily the harbingers of unwanted side effects. Indeed, the dissemination in the
environment of pesticide residues has been described as the world's foremost pollution
problem. The reasons are many and complex but the predominant fact is that large
quantities of chemical compounds that are toxic, mobile, and persistent are released
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On a more prosaic, but equally vital level, spillovers from agricultural pesticide
use have spurred a kaleidoscopic variety8 of common law actions against
pesticide manufacturers, applicators and farmers for personal and property

damages. Three categories of pesticide liability conflicts are reflected in the case

deliberately into the environment each year. By 1970 in the United States alone more than
a billion pounds (5 pounds per person) of some 900 registered pesticides (more than 50
percent for farm use) per year were entering the environment through various media.
These pesticides were aimed primarily at about 2000 pest species of plants and animals
but many of the other 200,000 species present "were either directly or indirectly affected
by these widespread pesticide applications."
... Although pesticides for farm use were first manufactured in 1902, we do know that
the industry did not experience explosive growth until the close of hostilities in World
War II when it put to use knowledge acquired from wartime research on DDT and other
compounds. The growth curve was dramatic in the early days: The dollar value of the
products produced in the U.S. rose from $440 million in 1964 to $12 billion in 1969. By
1976, U.S. farmers were using pesticides on 70 percent of the acreage planted, up from
50 percent only five years earlier. Usage increased fivefold between 1950 and 1978. The
estimates of production by U.S. chemical companies show an erratically rising curve that
is now at 1.5 billion pounds per year.
Id. at 397-99 (footnotes omitted).
Rachel Carson, of course, was an early advocate of prudent pesticide use and one of the intellectual
pioneers in the history of federal environmental laws. See generally Robert F. Blomquist, "Clean, New
World": Towardan IntellectualHistory of American EnvironmentalLaw, 1961-90, 25 VAL. U. L. REV.
1 (1990), reprintedin ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF ESSAYS IN LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 31-79 (Michael C. Blumm ed. 1993). In recent years, Barry Commoner has assumed
the role of vocal critic of pesticide application practices and presuppositions. In a recent book,
Commoner provides an illuminating second look at the widely-heralded statistics of increased American
agricultural productivity and the common assumption that pesticides have been a panacea for this
increased production. Commoner observes that while "U.S. output of crops and livestock" between 1950
and 1987 increased a total of 80 percent:
A major influence has been exerted by very specific changes in the technology of
production. The use of mechanical equipment remained constant, labor input decreased
by 71 percent, the use of seeds and feed increased by 86 percent - and the use of
agricultural chemicals (insecticides, herbicides, and fungicides) increased by 484 percent.
Thus, the major change in the technology of agricultural production has been the use of
less labor and much more agricultural chemicals. The efficiency with which the various
inputs generate the farm output is a major determinant of the farms' net returns. This is
expressed as productivity - that is, the ratio of output to input. Computed in this way,
between 1950 and 1970 the productivity of labor increased by 513 percent, the
productivity of machinery increased by 80 percent, the productivity of seeds and feed
decreased by 3 percent - and the productivity of agricultural chemicals decreased by 69
percent.
COMMONER, supra note 3, at 85-86 (original emphasis). For detailed statistics, see generally PESTICIDE
MANUAL, supranote 2, at 1-2 to 1-4. For a short history of pesticide regulation, see generally id. at 1-4
to 1-15 (describing, among other things, how an 1863 British statute to protect the public from
potentially harmful contact with chemicals - An Act For the More Effectual Condensation of Muriatic
Acid in Alkali Works - was the first Anglo-American legislative effort to protect the public from
potentially harmful contact with chemicals).
8. PESTICIDES AND ToXIC SUBSTANCES, supra note 1, at 325. Compare the fascinating variety of
criminal cases involving pesticides collected, id, at 323 n.14 (deliberate assaults with pesticides on
others); id. at n.15 (surreptitious poisonings subject to homicide charges).
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law: (1) personal injary product liability cases against the pesticide manufacturer
or seller; (2) crop damage product liability cases against the pesticide manufacturer or seller; and (3) "classical drift damage cases where third-party strangers to
the transaction suffer losses (usually to crops or livestock)" from exposure to
pesticides! The third category of disputes is, perhaps, the most dramatic societal
lesson of the "vast capacity for spillover damage" caused by agricultural
chemicals."0 Pesticide drift is a clearcut example of an environmental externality
because it can potentially cause a wide assortment of property damage to crops
and livestock of neighboring landowners and occupiers while posing risks of

9. Id. at 335.
10. Id. at 328. The "problem of drift from pesticide application" is aptly described in the PESTICIDE
MANUAL, supra note 2, at 19-1 to 19-2. According to the authors:
A large percentage of pesticide litigations involve off-target drift of pesticides at the time
of application. Lawvsuits have resulted from the drift of herbicides onto sensitive crops
where crop yields were seriously reduced or plants killed outright. Humans and domestic
animals have beei made ill directly by drift and indirectly by eating food or feed
contaminated by pesticide residues. Crops may become unsalable because of this
contamination, which may result in changes in appearance, size or quality, or in residues
that exceed tolerance. Beneficial insects, particularly honeybees, may be destroyed and
soil may become contaminated, causing damage to crops that follow. Fish and wildlife
may be killed or reproduction reduced by pesticide drift onto standing or running waters
and onto natural vegetation. Last, there may be annoying effects of drift in the form of
aerosol-size particles that result in human reactions such as allergies, bronchial irritations
and psychosomatic or imaginary illnesses. (Unpleasant odors make some people ill,
identified as chemophobia.)
Pesticide drift may be toxic to plants, domestic and wild animals, beneficial pollinators,
and man. Some pasticides exert their effect slowly while others act quickly. Some are
broken down readily in the environment while others tend to remain for long periods.
Responsibility and safety are overriding considerations in pesticide application, because
pesticide drift - losses from the target area - may affect the environment, persons living
and working in thrtt environment, downwind crops and bodies of water, and the applicator
himself.
Pesticide applications from aircraft and ground equipment drift off-target. Drift occurs
during every application, some more than others. For example, when a dust formulation
is applied, the dust cloud is easily followed with the eye as it moves along slowly over
the intended target, with some of the dust eventually moving off-target in the prevailing
air column. In this instance drift is evident because it is highly visible. Basically the same
thing happens with sprays, but the drift is essentially invisible and does not attract
attention.
What is drift? When pesticide sprays are applied to crops by aircraft or ground
equipment, a portion of the spray is generated in the form of very small droplets, so small
that they do not immediately impinge on the crop or fall to the ground, but rather they
remain suspended for varying lengths of time. As these small droplets remain suspended,
they become smaller due to evaporation of the water in them, causing them to remain
suspended even Icnger. During this time the air movement, though almost imperceptible,
gradually carries these suspended particles downwind and off-target.
The term drift or drift-loss as it applies to pesticide application is defined as the
movement of airborne liquid or solid material from the target area at the time of
application.
Id. (footnote omitted).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol48/iss2/11

19951

DAMAGES FROM CHEMICAL DRIFT

various personal injuries and diseases to human beings." Thus, common law tort
theories imposing liability for crop, livestock and personal damages on those
responsible for creating the pesticide drift (hereinafter referred to as "Pesticide
Driftmakers") should be understood as social efforts to internalize those external
costs by making the polluter pay. 2
In the remaining parts of this article, I provide further ruminations on
theoretical legal responsibilities of Pesticide Driftmakers. In Part H of the article,
I address empirical judicial liability calls regarding Pesticide Driftmakers under
what I refer to as the preexisting liability paradigm; this paradigm invokes
familiar tort theories of strict liability and negligence, peppered with occasional
references to nuisance and trespass. In Part ImI of the article, I sketch some
thoughts on reconceptualizing liability for pesticide drift. I tentatively explore the
possibility of combining the preexisting liability paradigm of the common law as
a fallback level of Pesticide Driftmaker responsibility with a new incentive-based
paradigm, initiated by state legislation, that would combine insurance provisions
with liability immunity opportunities based on principles of agricultural pollution
prevention and best agricultural practices.
II. The Preexisting Liability Paradigmfor Pesticide Driftmakers
A. Early Cases -

Before 1970

A hodgepodge of early cases addressed questions of liability for property or
personal injuries caused by agricultural pesticide drift from spraying or dusting
crops.'3 In formulating and applying various liability theories to hold Pesticide
Driftmakers, cropdusters and the persons hiring them, legally accountable, the
courts were not always lucid in their analyses. One court expressed the view that
"[i]n 4some cases, it is difficult to detect what theory the [courts were] following.,,
1. Landowner/HirerLiability
The consensus of courts addressing the issue have found the hirer (usually a
farmer) vicariously liable for the sprayer's negligence. The rationale for the
decisions in these cases is that cropdusting is an inherently dangerous or intrinsi-

11. See generally ROGER W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 32-34 (4th ed.
1995) (discussing the concept of external costs).
12. See generally id. at 238-42 (discussing liability regimes as devices to internalize external costs).
13. For early law review analyses of the problems of pesticide drift, see, e.g., Note, Crop Dusting:
Legal Problems in a New Industry, 6 STAN. L. REv. 69 (1953); Note, Liability for ChemicalDamage
FromAerial Crop Dusting,43 MINN. L. REV. 531 (1959); Comment, Crop Dusting-Scope of Liability
and a Need for Reform in Texas Law, 40 TEx. L. REV. 527 (1962); Note, Regulation and Liability in
the Application of Pesticides,49 IOWA L. REv. 135 (1963).
14. Loe v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312, 314 (Or. 1961).
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cally dangerous activity. 5 This characteristic creates an exception to the general

rule of nonliability of a hirer for the torts of an independent contractor.
A representative case in this line of precedent is the 1953 opinion by the

Supreme Court of New Mexico in Pendergrassv. Lovelace.6 The court held that
a landowner was not immune from tort liability for negligence just because the
pesticide spraying was conducted by an independent contractor because the work
involved (spraying the 2,4-D to cropland) was intrinsically and inherently dangerous. Accordingly, the defendant landowner was deemed to have assumed full

responsibility for the acts of the pilot. It was of no consequence, in the court's
view, whether or not the landowner had exercised due care in selecting the

contractor since the legal concept involved was vicarious liability - a variation
of strict liability for the negligence of others simply because of the status of the
defendant and the type of activity engaged in by the cropduster'

A landowner-hirer, in addition to being vicariously liable for the negligence of
cropdusters because of the perceived inherent or intrinsic danger of cropdusting,

has in pre-1970 cases been held directly liable for pesticide drift based on a
theory of strict liability for "ultrahazardous" activities."8

15. See Sanders v. Beckwith, 283 P.2d 235, 238 (Ariz. 1955); Lundberg v. Bolon, 194 P.2d 454,
458 (Ariz. 1948); S.A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker, 27 P.2d 678, 680 (Ariz. 1933); Heeb v. Prysock, 245
S.W.2d 577, 579 (Ark. 1952); McKennon v. Jones, 244 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Ark. 1951); Parks v. Atwood
Crop Dusters, 257 P.2d 653, 655 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953); Pannella v. Reilly, 23 N.E.2d 87, 88 (Mass.
1939); Lawler v. Skelton, 130 So. 2d 565,569 (Miss. 1961); Pendergrass v. Lovelace, 262 P.2d 231,232
(N.M. 1953); Burke v. Thomas, 313 P.2d 1082, 1088 (Okla. 1957). But see Pitchfork Land & Cattle Co.
v. King, 346 S.W.2d 598, 603-04 (Tex. 1961) (holding ranch owner who hired a spraying contractor to
perform herbicide spray is not liable for cropduster's negligence since the cropduster furnished all
necessary tools, supplies, and materials to perform the job); cf Leonard v. Abbot, 357 S.W.2d 778, 781
(Tex. Ct. App. 1962) (recognizing that a landowner may be liable for the duster's negligence even if the
duster is an independent contractor); Aerial Sprayers v. Yerger, Hill & Son, 306 S.W.2d 433, 437 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1957) (holding recognized landowner to be liable for cropduster's negligence).
16. 262 P.2d 231 (N.M. 1953).
17. Id One commentator has discussed the potential difficulties with this line of reasoning in the
following terms:
The most obvious question that arises under this statement of the law is: What is an
inherently dangerous activity? The courts are generally agreed that the application of 2-4-D
is an inherently dangerous activity, and the same reasoning has been applied to other
pesticides. The finding of an inherently dangerous activity is difficult, however, the crux
of the finding lies not in the activity per se, but rather, in the foreseeable harmful results
that inevitably follow from a miscarriage in the conduct of the activity. It will also turn
on the extent and type of harm to be expected. For example, it is inevitable that 2-4-D
drifting onto a broad-leaved crop will cause extensive damage to that crop, no matter what
precautions are t.ken. Thus, the finding of inherent danger in the activity turns on the
substance applied. While a court may readily find aerial application of pesticides
inherently dangerous, it does not necessarily follow that aerial application of other
substances, such vsseeds, will be found inherently dangerous, although it may in fact give
rise to substantial damage.
Craig A. Kennedy, Liaility in the Aerial Application of Pesticides, 22 S.D. L. REV. 75, 80 (1977)
(footnotes omitted).
18. See, e.g., Gotmiux v. Gary, 94 So. 2d 293 (La. 1957); Jones v. Morgan, 96 So. 2d 109 (La.
1957); Loe v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312 (Or. 1961). "In jurisdictions imposing strict liability for property
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2. SprayerLiability
Early court opinions have also resolved disputes involving the liability of a
pesticide sprayer for neighbors' crop, livestock or personal injuries. A panoply of
legal theories of tort liability - ranging from trespass to nuisance, negligence and
strict liability - have been discussed by the judiciary. Many times, however, the
courts' use of tort concepts in these opinions has been confusing and convoluted,
at best.
First, pre-1970 court opinions in a handful of cases have recognized, or at least
suggested the potential validity of, claims by neighbors against pesticide sprayers
predicated on variations of the intentional tort of trespass. 9 For example, in
Schronk v. Gilliam," the Texas Court of Civil Appeals analyzed the fact pattern
as a trespass action, noting that all parties conceded on argument that plaintiffs

crop damage was caused when the defendant-landowner's aircraft sprayed
pesticides, which drifted off-site onto plaintiffs lands. In somewhat jumbled
prose, the Schronk court held that the crop spraying undertaken by the defendant
was not privileged, was not undertaken in a reasonable manner, and unreasonably
interfered with the plaintiff-neighbor's enjoyment of the surface of his property."
The court concluded that whether the situation was viewed as a wrongful act after
rightful entry, or alternatively, as a trespass ab initio, was unimportant.22
Observing that the entry of the aircraft's fuselage, even at a privileged altitude,
was accompanied by active and continuous spraying of the agricultural chemicals "which constituted as much a part of the flight as if defendant's aircraft had been
dragging a great scythe across the land below it" - the court held that actionable
trespass had been established and no allegation of negligence was required.'

damage from the drifting of pesticides, '[t]he question in general is not whether defendant acted with due
care and caution, but whether his acts occasioned the damage'." Tybe A. Brett & Jane E.R. Potter, Risks
to Human HealthAssociated with Exposure to Pesticidesat the Time of Application and the Role of the
Courts, I VILL. L. REV. 355, 392 (1990) (quoting Young v. Darter, 363 P.2d 829, 833 (Okla. 1961))
(citing Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330)) (footnote omitted). "Thus, while the plaintiff need
not prove fault, causation must still be shown. Proof of causation, however, seems to justify the
imposition of liability, ajudgment that implies that the defendant has invaded an interest of the plaintiffs
worthy of protection." Brett & Potter, supra, at 392.
19. Compare, however, that the insistence that a trespass involve an invasion by an "object" or a
"thing" was rejected by the court in Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959) (holding
that gaseous and particulate fluorides from an aluminum smelter constituted a trespass for purposes of
the statute of limitations); Bradley v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 709 P.2d 782 (Wash. 1985)
(adopting elements of a trespass by airborne pollutants consistent with Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., 369
So. 2d 523, 529 (Ala. 1979) requiring, among other things, substantial damages to the RES); see, e.g.,
Aim v. Johnson, 275 P.2d 959 (Idaho 1954); Wall v. Trogdon, 107 S.E.2d 757 (N.C. 1959); Schronk v.
Gilliam, 380 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Ct. App. 1964).
20. 380 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Ct. App. 1964).
21. Id at 744-45.
22. Id. at 746.
23. Id. at 745. According to one commentator, "[tlhe cases applying trespass to aerial applicators
illuminate two different theories of trespass" - one is "negligent trespass"; the other is "unintentional
trespass." Kennedy, supra note 17, at 84-86. These unusual trespass cases, however, are "similar in
appearance" to early cases which imposed liability upon applicators on a theory of nuisance. Id. at 83-84;
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Second, courts in numerous early opinions have recognized that someone who
applies chemical dusts or sprays to crops may be liable for damages caused to

another, based on assorted views of negligence.' For instance, in the 1952 case,
Faire v. Burke,' the Supreme Court of Missouri noted that while it was clear
that farmers have the right to use various beneficial new chemical sprays and
dusts to maximize their crop production, a standard of due care informs a
sprayer's responsibility in applying the pesticides. Therefore, a sprayer has the
duty to check the weather and to ascertain that weather conditions are not likely
to spread pesticides onto adjoining landowners' property.26
By way of another example, the New Jersey court in Smith v. Okerson2"

discussed principles of negligence law in the course of analyzing an action
brought by a dairy farmer against a potato grower/sprayer for pesticide drift
harmful to the plaintiffs dairy herd.' Articulating standard negligence concepts,29 the court noted that a variety of factors would inform the decision of
whether or not the sprayer had used reasonable care in applying pesticides: (1)

cf. Gainey v. Folkman, 114 F. Supp. 231 (D. Ariz. 1953); Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 73 P.2d 1260 (Cal.
1937).
24. See, e.g., Aerial Agric. Serv. v. Richard, 264 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1959) (applying Mississippi
law); Walton v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 191 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1951) (applying Arkansas law and
recognizing rule); Motors Ins. Corp. v. Aviation Specialties, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 973 (W.D. Mich. 1969);
Sanders v. Beckwith, 283 P.2d 235 (Ariz. 1955); Lundberg v. Bolon, 194 P.2d 454 (Ariz. 1948); W.B.
Bynum Cooperage Co. v. Coulter, 244 S.W.2d 955 (Ark. 1952); McKennon v. Jones, 244 S.W.2d 138
(Ark. 1951); Kennedy v. Clayton, 227 S.W.2d 934 (Ark. 1950); Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 222
S.W.2d 820 (Ark. 1949); Hammond Ranch Corp. v. Dodson, 136 S.W.2d 484 (Ark. 1940); Andreen v.
Escondido Citrus Union; 269 P. 556 (Cal. 1928); Kolberg v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 269 P. 975 (Cal.
1928); Yasukochi, Inc. v. McKibbin, 312 P.2d 770 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); Adams v. Henning, 255 P.2d
456 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953); Parks v. Atwood Crop Dusters, 257 P.2d 653 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953); Lenk v.
Spezia, 213 P.2d 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949); Miles v. A. Arena & Co., 73 P.2d 1260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1937);
Nizzi v. Laverty Sprayers, Inc., 143 N.W.2d 312 (Iowa 1966); Kentucky Aerospray, Inc. v. Mays, 251
S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1952); Dupre v. Roane Flying Serv., Inc., 196 So. 2d 835 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Lawler
v. Skelton, 130 So. 2d 565 (Miss. 1961); Faire v. Burke, 252 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. 1952); Rose v. Buffalo
Air Serv., 104 N.W.2d 431 (Neb. 1960); Smith v. Okerson, 73 A.2d 857 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1950);
Christensen v. Midstate Aerial Applications Corp., 166 N.W.2d 386 (N.D. 1969); Olmstead v. Reedy,
387 P,2d 631 (Okla. 1963); Hiller v. Rist, 362 P.2d 678 (Okla. 1961); Wieting v. Ball Air Spray, Inc.,
173 N.W.2d 272 (S.D. 1969); Pitchfork Land & Cattle Co. v. King, 346 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. 1961);
Gamblin v. Ingram, 378 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. Ct. App. 1964); Bruenger v. Burkett, 364 S.W.2d 453 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1963); Aerial Sprayers v. Yerger, Hill & Sun, 306 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Ct. App. 1957); Schultz
v. Harless, 271 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Ct. App. 1954); Miller v. Maples, 278 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. Ct. App.
1954).
25. 252 S.W.2d 289 (Mo. 1952).
26. Id.
27. 73 A.2d 857 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1950).
28. In somewhat unusual facts, the plaintiff-dairy farmer contended that defendant-potato grower
had caused pesticide drift from a spraying apparatus to drift onto plaintiffs dairy farm; plaintiff proved
that in order to save his herd he had to move his cattle rather than allowing them to remain in pasture
and to eat the contaminated fodder. Ultimately, the plaintiff recovered for the value of the abandoned
fodder. Id. at 859.
29. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF T RTs §§ 291-293 (1965) (discussing "unreasonableness," "magnitude of risk," and "utility of conduct").
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the likelihood that the act will cause injury to another; (2) the likelihood that the
injury will be serious; (3) the utility of the act itself; and (4) the feasibility of a
substitution such that the same benefits could be achieved with less hazard to
others." Moreover, a number of courts have held that in determining whether a
pesticide sprayer is negligent, the previous experience and knowledge of the
sprayer are critical in adjudicating whether the sprayer was on notice or should
have been aware of unreasonable dangers created by the pesticide application. 1
The most common relevant facts in early negligence cases are: (1) use of an
improper chemical concentration; (2) incorrect equipment calibration; (3)
application of the chemical under improper weather conditions; (4) failure to
utilize proper equipment; and (5) application in an improper place.32
30. See Smith, 73 A.2d 857 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1950).
31. See, e.g., Chapman Chem. Co. v. Taylor, 222 S.W.2d 820, 825 (Ark. 1949) (affirming
defendant's verdict for nonliability since defendant had no previous experience in the use of agricultural
chemicals which could have given defendant an indication of the danger of using 2, 4-D to a crop almost
a mile away from the target site); Bums v. Vaughan, 224 S.W.2d 365, 366 (Ark. 1949) (affirming award
of damages for negligent pesticide application, and noting that the defendant knew that another farmer
living a few miles away from the defendant had released the same pesticide by airplane two weeks before
defendant's spraying and that this previous incident had resulted in damages); Cole v. New England Tree
Expert Co., 163 A. 742, 743 (R.I. 1933) (affirming award of compensatory damages to plaintiff
landowner for the death of a cow resulting from spraying by a tree service, and noting that one of the
sprayer's employees admitted that he had been warned to be careful in applying the pesticide spray
because of the close proximity of plaintiffs dairy farm and, yet, the employee gave no notice to the
plaintiff or other nearby landowners of the impending spraying); McPherson v. Billington, 399 S.W.2d
186, 190 (Tex. Ct. App. 1965) (affirming award of damages in favor of pig farmer; the defendant
cropduster testified that at the time he was spraying an adjoining cotton field with pesticides he knew
that plaintiffs swine pens were close to the spraying area while also being aware that the arsenic acid
spray was a dangerous poison to animal life and the pesticide containers provided such a warning).
Compare early cases that rejected pesticide sprayer liability when the plaintiff was deemed to be
contributorily negligent. In Lenk v. Spezia, 213 P.2d 47, 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949), for example, the
intermediate appellate court affirmed a judgment for the defendant tomato sprayer in an action brought
by a farmer for death of his bees due to cropdusting. The court concluded, inter alia, that the record
below indicated that the bee farmer knew of the impending nearby cropdusting but failed to exercise
ordinary care in removing or adequately screening his bees. Id. at 53.
Compare pre-1970 cases that have adjudicated the effect of the plaintiffs failure to give a statutorilymandated notice of damages stemming from pesticide application as a precondition to suit. In general,
the early cases have interpreted and applied these statutory provisions in favor of the plaintiff. See, e.g.,
Olmstead v. Reedy, 387 P.2d 631, 633 (Okla. 1963) (holding, in response to defendant's contention that
the plaintiff had given insufficient written notice under an Oklahoma 60-day notice statute, that the
statute was substantially complied with when the plaintiff provided written notice of pesticide damage
to his growing crops - pecan trees, shade trees and ornamental shrubs -but had not mentioned damage
to his truck patch or alfalfa since the statute was not intended as an evidentiary bar, but merely as a
provision to allow defendants the opportunity to investigate the circumstances of purported pesticide
damages while the evidence was fresh); Cross v. Harris, 370 P.2d 703, 706 (Or. 1962) (rejecting
cropduster's argument that notice statute should bar recovery of pesticide damage to plaintiffs barley crop
because statutory objection was waived by the defendant's failure to file a demurrer); Loe v. Lenhardt,
362 P.2d 312, 319 (Or. 1961) (rejecting an argument by the defendant crop sprayer that plaintiff was
barred from recovering crop damage for failure to file a report of loss prior to commencing suit because
plaintiffs cause of action was based on a common law right which required the notice statute to be
carefully construed and because plaintiff substantially complied with the statute).
32. Cropduster's Failure to Exercise Care in Spraying .Crops, 9 PROOF OF FACTs 623, 628-29
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Third, a few pre-1970 court opinions applied the theory of strict liability in tort
to hold pesticide sprayers liable for drift-related damages. For instance, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in the 1961 opinion of Young v. Darter" held the
evidence to be sufficient to sustain judgment in favor of a neighboring cotton
farmer for damage to his cotton crop based on a strict liability theory against the
defendant-farmer/sprayer. The defendant sprayed 2,4-D and water, but contended
that he lacked knowledge of the pesticide's hazardous qualities and its propensity
to drift. The court, however, was not impressed by the defendant's purported lack
of knowledge. The Young court applied strict liability principles and held that the
law required the sprayer/farmer to not infringe upon the rights of adjoining
farmers to be free of harmful pesticide drift when exercising his own right to use
pesticides to enhance his crop. 4
B. Later Cases

-

1970 to Present

The kaleidoscopic and ad hoe nature of judicial opinions issued in response to
lawsuits brought by plaintiffs against Pesticide Driftmakers for property and
personal damages has continued unabated from 1970 to the present. Little
doctrinal change has occurred in the case law during the last twenty-five years.
Nevertheless, a few interesting judicial trends and developments are noteworthy.
1. Continued Judicial Reluctance to Use Intentional Tort Theories
Courts continue to be reluctant to impose classical intentional tort theories to
pesticide drift cases. While one might suspect, on a theoretical level, that "classical trespass law would be strongly accounted for ... [since] the instrument of
damage, after all, is an unwelcome and direct invasion by toxic aerosols," 5
recent case law yields few reported examples of this sort. 6 One commentator
has speculated that the explanation for this trend is that judicial "analysis usually
flows in other doctrinal channels, primarily because the wrong is perceived as

(1977). Judicial views of the nature of aerial application of pesticides as "inherently or/ extremely
dangerous," see supra notes 15 to 18 and accompanying text, have tended to "hold aerial applicators and

the farmers for whom thry work to a very high standard of care because of the recognized danger of the
operation." Richard D. Chappuis, Jr., The Flight of Toxic Tort - Aerial Application of Insecticides and

Herbicides:From DriftLiability to Toxic Tort, 58 J. AIR L. & CoM. 411,420 (1992) (footnotes omitted).
33. 363 P.2d 829 (Okla. 1961).
34. Id. at 833. Arguments in favor of imposing strict liability for pesticide drift are set forth in pre1970 legal literature. See, e.g., Note, Regulation andLiability in the Application of Pesticides, 49 IowA

L. REv. 135 (1963); Nos.e, Liabilityfor ChemicalDamagefrom Aerial Crop Dusting,43 MINN. L. REV.
531 (1959); Note, Crop Dusting: Legal Problems in a New Industry, 6 STAN. L. REv. 69 (1953).
35. PESTICIDES AND Toxic SUBSTANCES, supra note 1,at 336 (footnote omitted).
36. See, e.g., Texa. v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236,239 (10th Cir. 1971) (holding that release of pesticide
residues in one state thot pollutes an interstate stream serving as a source of municipal water in another
state constitutes a violation of the federal common law of nuisance); Hall v. Pioneer Crop Care, Inc., 512
P.2d 491 (Kan. 1973); Hall v. Phillips, 436 NV.2d 139, 141-46 (Neb. 1989) (raising a question of
possible intentional nui;ance resulting from wind blown soil containing herbicide).
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being an isolated tortious event rather than the misfiring of a continuous
relationship between the parties."37
2. Continued Scarcity of Strict Liability Rulings
Another phenomenon in the pesticide drift case law over the last twenty-five
years has been the continued scarcity of appellate judicial opinions addressing the
question of whether or not Pesticide Driftmakers are liable under the theory of
strict liability for hazardous activities to neighbors for crop, livestock or personal
injuries."
In this regard, the Supreme Court of Washington's 1977 opinion in Langan v.
Valicopters, Inc. 9 constitutes the leading state appellate opinion decided during
the last twenty-five years. The case breaks new ground by finding Pesticide
Driftmakers strictly liable for off-site damages caused by agricultural chemical
drift." In Langan, organic farmers sued an aerial applicator of pesticides for
unintentionally spraying a pesticide known as thiodan on rows of vegetables
farmed by plaintiffs. The defendant Valicopters was spraying an adjacent farm
in Washington State in order to abate an infestation of Colorado beetles.4' The
Langans' entire property was decertified by the Northwest Organic Food
Producers' Association (NOFPA) because of the property's contamination by
pesticides sprayed by Valicopters. After a jury trial, a judgment of $5,500 in
compensatory damages was entered for the loss of plaintiffs entire vegetable crop.
On certification to the Supreme Court of Washington, the court affirmed,
concluding that the activity of applying pesticides was an "abnormally dangerous
activity" under section 519 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The court based
its conclusion on a balancing of the following factors: (a) drift from pesticide
spraying presented a high risk of harm; (b) the gravity of the harm which may
result to an adjacent organic farmer from pesticide application was great; (c) the
risk of pesticide harm to adjacent property owners could not be eliminated by the
exercise of reasonable care; (d) aerial cropdusting was an activity which was not
a matter of common usage in the area in question; (e) the application of pesticides
adjacent to an organic fanning area was conducted in an inappropriate place; and
(f) that the value of cropdusting to the community, while significant, was not
determinative 2 In conclusion, the Supreme Court of Washington reasoned as follows:

37. PEsnCIDES AND Toxic SUBSTANCES, supranote 1, at 336-37.

38. See supra notes 18, 31-33 and accompanying text (pre-1970 strict liability decisions).
39. 567 P.2d 218 (Wash. 1977).
40. See also Russell v. Windsor Props., Inc., 336 So. 2d 219 (La. Ct. App. 1978); Trotter v. Callens,
546 P.2d 867 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 549 P.2d 285 (N.M. 1976).
41. Langan, 567 P.2d at 219.

42. Id. at 222-23. Section 519 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that "[o]ne who carries
on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of
another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 519 (1977). Section 520 lists six factors to be considered in
determining whether an activity - like application of pesticides - is "abnormally dangerous." These
factors consist of the following:
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In the present case, the Langans were eliminated from the organic
food market for 1973 through no fault of their own. If cropdusting

continues on the adjoining property, the Langans may never be able
to sell their crops to organic food buyers. Appellants, on the other

hand, will profit from the continued application of pesticides. Under
these circumstances, there can be an equitable balancing of social
interests only if appellants are made to pay for the consequences of

their acts.43
While Langan was embraced enthusiastically by some commentators as an
innovative harbinger of "a revitalized doctrine of hazardous activity strict

liability"" with far-reaching implications for "promising new applications,"'4
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of
another,
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous
attributes.
Id. § 520.
43. Langan, 567 P.2d at 223.
44. Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Revitalization of HazardousActivity Strict Liability,
65 N.C. L. REV. 257, 314 (1987).
45. ld. at 257. Interestingly, Nolan and Ursin contend that the Supreme Court of Washington's
Langan decision "stands at odds with the Restatement (Second)." Id. at 275. According to this analysis:
[The [Langan] court applied strict liability to the activity of crop dusting when
defendant's pestizide had settled on a neighbor's organic farm. The court stated that it had
previously "adopted the Restatement (Second) .... [that it had] considered each of the
factors listed in the Restatement .... [and that] in this case, each test of the Restatement
is met." This is a remarkable conclusion. The court, in its opinion, "[recognized] the
prevalence of crop dusting and [acknowledged that] 287 aircraft were used in 1975."
These acknowlelged facts cast doubts on the applicability of the last three Restatement
(Second) factorc. A careful analysis of the Langan court's treatment of these factors
demonstrates that Langan, like the [Supreme Court of Washington's] earlier Siegler [v.
Kuhlman] case, [502 P.2d 1181 (Wash. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973) (finding
strict liability for a gasoline explosion caused when defendant trucker's gasoline trailer
overturned)] stands for the proposition that the Restatement (Second) is not the proper
focus for strict liability analysis.
Regarding th- requirement that an activity not occur as a matter of common usage, the
Langan court first quoted the Restatement (Second) definition: "An activity is a matter
of common usage if it is customarily carried on by the great mass of mankind, or by
many people in the community." The court then recited the above-quoted facts and simply
characterized th-.presence of 287 aircraft as indicative that crop dusting was "carried on
by only a comparatively small number of persons." It thus concluded that crop dusting
was "not a matter of common usage." The court offered no more than this terse
explanation, and it did not attempt to explain why the operation of so many aircraft did
not constitute common usage. When read in conjunction with the Siegler trucking case,
Langan suggests that common usage, at least as that term normally would be defined,
does not defeat strict liability. Similarly, the Langan court's treatment of the appropriateness to the place criterion suggest that this factor also has no place in contemporary strict
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and was viewed as the functional beginning of a trend toward greater judicial
acceptance of strict liability for cropdusters,46 in reality, Langan has not spurred
a significant increase of strict liability holdings against Pesticide Driftmakers and
has captured only lukewarm precedential interest in other courts.4 7
liability analysis. Although conceding that crop dusting was prevalent and done in large
portions of the Yakima Valley, the court's entire statement on the appropriateness of the
place factor appears in one sentence: "Given the nature of organic farming, the use of
pesticides adjacent to such an area must be considered an activity conducted in an
inappropriate place." In effect, the court found strict liability despite the common sense
intuition that crop dusting may be quite appropriate in a valley in which its use by farmers
is prevalent. In tandem with the earlier application of strict liability to trucking on
highways, the Langan decision suggests that the Washington Supreme Court implicitly
applies strict liability to hazardous activities that are appropriate to the place in which they
occur.
The Langan court's treatment of the final Restatement (Second) factor, which assesses
an activity's value to the community, suggests that this factor also does not constitute a
part of that court's strict liability analysis. Again, the court asserted that this factor was
met, but its analysis suggested not only that the court ignored this factor, but also that the
loss spreading policy played a role in its decision.
The Washington Supreme Court's Siegler and Langan decisions illustrate a developing
body of strict liability doctrine, which focuses on the hazardousness of an enterprises
activity and the loss spreading policy. This case has developed independently of and more
expansively than the Restatement. Although the Washington court purported to adhere to
the Restatement (Second), other jurisdictions [including the Oregon crop dusting case of
Loe v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312 (Or. 1961)] have explicitly rejected the restrictions of the
Restatement and Restatement (Second), together with their underlying premises.
Id. at 274-77 (footnotes omitted).
46. William K. Jones, Strict LiabilityforHazardousEnterprise,92 COLuM. L. REv. 1705, 1738-39
(1992).
47. Since 1977, five out-of-court jurisdictions have cited Langan. In most cases, the citing cases
did not follow the holding in Langan imposing strict liability on aerial application of cropdusting as an
"abnormally dangerous activity" under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (1977).
IndianaHarborBelt Co. v. American Cyanamid Co. involved a railroad yard's action against a shipper
for cleanup costs from a chemical spill, in which the trial court judge held that shipping acrylonitrite
through an area adjoining a residential area of Chicago was an abnormally dangerous activity for which
the shipper was strictly liable. Langan was cited in support of the proposition that "it is fairer to place
the burden of the loss on the person who created the inordinate risk than on someone who has no relation
to the activity other than an injury from it." Indiana Harbor Belt Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 662
F. Supp. 635, 639 (N.D. II1. 1987), appealdismissed, 860 F.2d 1441 (7th Cir. 1988), rev'd & remanded,
916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) (criticizing the lower court's analysis and finding no strict
liability based, in part, on the common activity of shipping chemicals through the Chicago railyards).
In SKF Farms v. Superior Court (HummingbirdInc.), a cropdusting case, the intermediate appellate
court noted that "no California court has ever squarely addressed the issue of whether cropdusting is
abnormally dangerous and therefore subject to strict liability." SKF Farms v. Superior Court
(Hummingbird Inc.), 200 Cal. Rptr. 497, 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). Langan was cited as one of only a
handful of "agricultural jurisdictions" that have confronted the issue and held cropdusting to be
ultrahazardous. Id.The intermediate appellate court held that "it was error [for the trial court] to sustain
the demurrer to Petitioner's strict liability causes of action" when the trial court considered "only one of
the six factors" addressed in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id.
The court in Bloxsom v. San Luis Valley Crop Care, Inc. applied principles of res ipsa loquitur.
Langan was cited in juxtaposition with the proposition that "[b]ecause of our disposition of this case, we
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Besides Langan, from 1970 to the present, only a smattering of other appellate
opinions have addressed the issue of liability of agricultural Pesticide Driftmakers

under a theory of strict liability for hazardous activities. In the 1979 case, J.L.
Wilson Farms,Inc. v.Wallace, the Arkansas intermediate appellate court held that
the aerial application of the herbicide 2,4-D on rice fields in the vicinity of

plaintiffs cotton crops; "necessarily involved a risk of serious harm to broad leaf
crops of others regardless of the degree of care which is exercised in its use.' 4
Therefore, strict liability against the owner and applicator was appropriate. SKF
Farms v. Superior Court (Hummingbird Inc.) 49 involved an action by California

lettuce growers against adjoining wheat and grain farmers. The plaintiffs
contended that the latter were strictly liable when the herbicide 2,4-D drifted onto
the lettuce growers' fields, causing severe crop damage. In reviewing the trial
court's grant of a demurrer, which ruled as a matter of law that cropdusting is not
an ultrahazardous activity subject to strict liability, the appellate court noted that
"although several early decisions from California... have discussed liability for

cropdusting in terms of negligence or nuisance.., no California court has ever
squarely addressed the issue of whether cropdusting is abnormally dangerous and
therefore subject to strict liability."50 The SKF Farms court noted a few out-ofjurisdiction appellate decisions and law review articles in support of strict liability

for cropdusting, and canvassed the provisions of section 520 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, but concluded that "by its very nature, the issue of whether an

activity is ultrahazardous cannot be decided on demurrer."'"

need not reach the contention . .. that San Luis should be held responsible for the destruction of
Bloxsom's alfalfa crop on principles of strict liability." Bloxsom v. San Luis Valley Crop Care, Inc., 596
P.2d 1189, 1191 n.3 (Colo. 1979).
In Ligocky v. Wilcox, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico held that strict liability in tort did not
apply to an individual who aerially applied herbicide to the owner's milo field to kill weeds where the
owner supplied the herbicide to the applicator. Langan was cited by a dissenting judge in support of his
view that strict liability for cropdusting was suggested by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519520 (1977). Ligocky v. Wilcox, 620 P.2d 1300, 1303 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
In Erbrich Prods. Co., Inc. v. Wills, the appellate court found strict liability under RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1977) to be inapplicable because the activity of using chlorine gas in
a manufacturing plant could be undertaken safely. Langan was cited for the proposition that the issue
of strict liability should be decided by the court). Erbrich Prods. Co., Inc. v. Wills, 509 N.E.2d 850, 857
(Ind. Ct. App. 1987).
Therefore, while the Stpreme Court of Washington may view its decision in Langan as an example
of its broad-based approach "in adopting new remedies and expanding tort liability," in general, Wyman
v. Wallace, 588 P.2d 1133. 1134 (Wash. 1979), other American courts have been much less venturesome
in attempting to expand tort liability to encompass strict liability for application of pesticides. Indeed,
the Supreme Court of Washington itself seems to be retrenching a bit in its strict liability analysis under
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1977). See, e.g., New Meadows Holding Co. v.
Washington Water Power Co., 687 P.2d 212, 215-17 (Wash. 1984) (affirming the holding of the
intermediate appellate court that the transmission of natural gas through underground lines is not an
"abnormally dangerous activity" giving rise to strict liability).
48. 590 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Ark. Ct. App. 1979).
49. 200 Cal. Rptr. 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
50. Id.at 498 (citation omitted).
51. Id. at 499.
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In deciding the 1977 case, Bella v. Aurora Air, Inc., 2 the Supreme Court of
Oregon reversed a judgment non obstante veredicto that "set aside a jury verdict
for damage done to their mint crop by a herbicide which defendant Aurora was
engaged to spray by airplane on the wheat field of [a] neighbor."53 In a
thoughtful opinion written by Justice Linde, the court cited its decision in Loe v.
Lenhardt for the precedent that strict liability is a viable cause of action against
Pesticide Driftmakers.' The Bella court brushed aside a pre-suit statutory filing
requirement, and reaffirmed its earlier decision imposing strict liability against
landowners for pesticide drift caused by a contractor's spraying, stating that "even
when the risk only moderately threatens economic activities rather than harm to
life, health, or property or environment . . . the activity may nevertheless be
'abnormally dangerous' if it can be carried on only with a substantially uncontrollable likelihood that the damage will sometime occur. '"" Moreover, in a 1988
Oregon intermediate appellate court opinion, Speer & Sons Nursery, Inc. v.
Duyck,"6 the court reversed a trial court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to
state a cause of action in a case involving the ground spraying by tractor of a
herbicide on a nursery where an adjoining oat and wheat farmer claimed crop
damage from pesticide drift. The Speer court observed that "[w]hether groundbased chemical spraying is an abnormally dangerous activity [was] an issue of
first impression" in Oregon. 7 Drawing upon prior Oregon pesticide drift case
law, the intermediate appellate court remanded the legal determination of whether
or not ground spraying of pesticides was abnormally dangerous, and therefore
subject to strict liability, to the trial court, noting:
Two types of information, legal and factual, are relevant to the
resolution of that question. However, information from neither source
is sufficient at this stage of the proceeding to provide an answer.
The legal information is found in statutes and regulations, which
reflect policy and value judgments regarding an activity. A court, trial
or appellate, may look to such enactments in determining whether or
not an activity is abnormally dangerous. Here, we have no legal
[statutory or regulatory] sources to guide us.
The second source of information is the facts relating to the activity
58
[and whether or not the "factual setting" is "extra hazardous"].
During the last twenty-five years there have also been a few decisions declining
to impose strict liability on Pesticide Driftmakers and requiring proof of negligence.
Perhaps the most significant recent case declining to impose strict liability in this

52. 566 P.2d 489 (Or. 1977).
53. Id. at 490.
54. Id. at 493 (citing Loe v. Lenhardt, 362 P.2d 312 (Or. 1961)).

55. Id. at 495.
56. 759 P.2d 1133 (Or. Ct. App. 1988).
57. Id. at 1134 (emphasis added).
58. Id. (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
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context is the Supreme Court of Wisconsin's 1984 decision in Bennet v. Larsen Co.9
In Bennet, beekeepers brought a multi-count action for damages for death of their
honeybees allegedly caused by the application of the pesticide Sevin on neighboring
cornfields by the defendant lessee. Looking to the six factors contained in section
520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a unanimous court quoted a comment to
the Restatement (Second) that provides as follows: "The essential question is whether
the risk created is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or because of the
circumstances surrounding it, as to justify the imposition of strict liability for the
harm that results from it, even though it is carried on with all reasonable care. " '
In a marked departure from the Supreme Court of Washington's approach in
Langan,6 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Bennet held "that pesticide application
is not an ultrahazardous activity warranting the application of strict liability for
resulting harm"' based on the following analysis:
As indicated on the pesticide labels, pesticides can be highly toxic to
honeybees and can cause a significant degree of harm through direct bee
kills and subsequent depletion of hive populations when contaminated
pollen is ingested by the hive bees. Although pesticide spraying may
produce some risk of harm to honeybees on the property and to bees in
hives located off the property from drift or overspraying, that risk can be
reduced through the exercise of reasonable care in spraying. Precautionary measures to minimize bee kills on the property and to reduce the risk
of drift or overspray include monitoring wind speed and direction,
temperature and humidity conditions, and spraying at times bees are less
likely to forage. An experienced applicator testified that spraying could
be accurate to within one or two feet on the target field. Further,
pesticide harm can be reduced by carefully following label directions,
which are designed to reduce the risk of harm with proper application
and use.
Testimony at trial showed that pesticide application to control severe
pest infestation is a common activity which is necessary to ensure
healthy crop growth. Testimony revealed that several canning companies
in the ... area each year sprayed pesticides on their corn in order to
avoid the potential complete destruction of their crops by corn borers and
earworms. We conclude that the application of pesticides is a necessary
and beneficial activity to ensure the production of adequate and healthy
food and that its value to the people of the state outweighs the potential
for harm.'

59. 348 N.W.2d 540 ,,Wis. 1984).
60. ld. at 553 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS cmt. f (1977)).
61. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
62. Bennet, 348 N.W 2d at 553.
63. Id. Similarly, the Texas intermediate appellate court in Sun Pipe Line Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 514
S.W.2d 789, 791-94 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974), also chose not to impose strict liability on Pesticide
Driftmakers. A landowner brought an action against an oil pipeline and its herbicide applicator for
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3. Continued JudicialRulings Resting on Expansive Conceptions of Negligence
Law
During the last quarter century, the pattern of pre-1970 cases remained intact:

"Itihe vast majority of actions brought against [pesticide] applicators and their

employees [were] grounded in negligence."' Moreover, the courts continued to
"almost invariably impose a high degree of care upon the applicator' in analyzing

the relevant duty of care. This "broad conception of negligence"' is illustrated by

the 1973 opinion of the Supreme Court of Kansas in Binder v. Perkins.' Farmers
who leased an alfalfa field obtained a judgment against the operator of an aerial
cropdusting firm who had applied 2,4-D herbicide to a neighboring wheat field under
contract with the wheat farmer. In affirming the trial court decision, the Bindercourt
endorsed "[t]he duty of care imposed upon [a] crop sprayer" as predicated on "a
dangerous instrumentality, [the] handling of [which is] a hazardous activity and [that]
the one handling [the pesticide has] a duty to prevent its escape."' The Binder court
observed that its rationale encompassed "the outline of a high degree of care ....
It is no more than an application of the standard that. . . '[w]hat are reasonable

precautions vary with the character of the business ....A peculiar hazard calls for
increased care; and the greater the risk, the more imperative the obligation'."' Since

1970, liability on a negligence theory has been imposed for the applicator's failure
to prevent pesticide drift from damaging neighboring lettuce crops," for damages

damages to growing timber and to fences. Sun Pipe Line owned an easement approximately thirty feet
in width across the northern boundary of plaintiffs property. Sun hired the herbicide applicator to spray
overhanging tree limbs on plaintiffs property which prevented Sun from using airplanes to patrol and
inspect the pipeline for leaks. Plaintiff landowner testified that "a large number of his trees were killed;
others, weakened by the spray, became infested with beetles and died; [moreover] ...trees which were
killed fell across his fences causing further damage." Id. at 790. While technically not a "drift" case since Sun sprayed his own property interest, which happened to be across plaintiffs fee interest - the
case is interesting because of the court's reliance on prior analogous Texas cropdusting precedent in drift
cases as the rationale for rejecting strict liability theories and requiring the plaintiff to prove negligence.
See id. at 791-94.
64. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 78 (footnote omitted).
65. Id.
66. Jones, supra note 47, at 1739.
67. 516 P.2d 1012 (Kan. 1973).
68. Id. at 1016.
69. Id. (citations omitted). A similar conception of a very high standard of care in pesticide
application cases was articulated by the Supreme Court of Alabama in Boroughs v. Joiner, 337 So. 2d
340, 343 (Ala. 1976). The Alabama Supreme Court noted that negligent liability for a landowner
contracting with a pesticide applicator is:
not absolute but is imposed on the landowner for his failure to exercise due care in a
situation in which the work being performed is sufficiently dangerous that the landowner
himself has a duty to third persons who may sustain injury or damage from the work
unless proper precautions are taken in the performance thereof.
Id.; see also Ligocky v. Wilcox, 620 P.2d 1300, 1302 (N.M. 1980) ("As the danger that should
reasonably be foreseen increases, so the amount of care required also increases.").
70. Farm-Aero Serv., Inc. v. Henning Produce, Inc., 532 P.2d 181 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975).
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to adjacent tomatoes, squash and Irish potatoes,7 for overspray of a rice field
resulting in circumstantial evidence of damages to a neighboring cotton field, for
drift damage to caladium plants from spray of neighboring ditches and canals,73 for
alfalfa crop injuries due to a shift in the wind,74 for drift from timber spraying
activities onto a cotton field,75 for drift onto a redclover crop during warm weather
conditions,76 for darage to soybeans occasioned by a cropduster spraying over
adjacent farmland,' for death and injury to cows which became severely ill two
days after a cropduster sprayed a neighbor's field with Thimet, used for rootworm

control,78 and for the killing and contamination of numerous catfish at a commercial

catfish farm by neighboring application of pesticides to cotton and soybean fields.79
In the proof of pesticide drift cases, judicial decisions predicated on negligence
concepts have recently "wander[ed] close to the domain of strict liability"" through
invocation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and use of statutory and regulatory
violations to establish negligence per se. For example, in both the 1979 Colorado
Supreme Court opinion in Bloxsom v. San Luis Valley Crop Care, Inc., t and the
1980 Georgia intermediate appellate court opinion in DeVane v. Smith,'2 the
judiciary used res ipsa loquitur to form a presumption of negligence where the
respective crops of the plaintiffs suddenly withered and died. Negligence per se,

as in other areas of negligence law, is readily established in pesticide drift cases by
showing "a violation of registration, labeling, or other provisions of the law."" The

71. Sullivan v. Voyles, 462 S.W.2d 454 (Ark. 1971).
72. Hamlin Flying S rv., Inc. v. Breckinridge, 628 S.W.2d 312 (Ark. 1982).
73. Mulford Hickerson Corp. v. Asgrow-Kilgore Co., 282 So. 2d 19 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
74. Binder v. Perkins, 516 P.2d 1012 (Kan. 1973).
75. Mid-Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Whitehead, 357 So. 2d 122 (Miss. 1978).
76. Watkins v. Johnson, 606 S.W.2d 493 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
77. Red River Spray Serv., Inc., v. Nelson, 404 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
78. Mustion v. Ealy, 266 N.W.2d 730 (Neb. 1978).
79. D&W Jones, Inc. v. Collier, 372 So. 2d 288 (Miss. 1979). The court applied an expansive joint
liability theory for the defendants' negligence. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that where the
defendants farmers and cropdusters knew or reasonably should have known of the catfish-producing
operations of the neighbcring plaintiff corporation, and the toxic effect of agricultural poisons on fish
and of the fact that other defendants were making similar application of pesticides in the area, the
defendants' collective actions constituted an implied concert of action which subjected them to potential
joint and several liability for the alleged single, indivisible injury to plaintiffs catfish-producing
operations. I. at 294.
80. PESTICIDES AND Toxic SUBSTANCES, supra note 1, at 341.
81. 596 P.2d 1189 (Colo. 1979).
82. 268 S.E.2d 711 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980).
83. Id. at 713. Compare analogous pesticide cases applying res ipsa loquiturto situations of product
mixup by manufacturers or applicators leading to crop damage being suffered by the landowner. See
Eaeton Fruit Co. v. California Spray-Chem. Corp., 445 P.2d 437 (Ariz. 1968); Burr v. Sherwin-Williams
Co., 268 P.2d 1041 (Cal. 1954) (product mixup); Thomas Helicopters, Inc. v. San Tan Ranches, 633 P.2d
1145 (Idaho 1981) (pesticide applicator hired to spray insecticide on sugar beet crop sprayed a herbicide
by mistake).
84. PESTICIDES AND Toxic SUBSTANCES, supra note 1, at 342. See aLvo Kennedy, supra note 17,
at 90-94.
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Wisconsin Supreme Court's 1984 opinion in Bennett v. Larsen' is an excellent
recent example of judicial use of negligence per se principles in a pesticide drift
context. In Bennett, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had violated the
Wisconsin Economic Poisons Act, which prohibited the "[u]se [of] any pesticide in
a manner inconsistent with its labeling.'186 The court concluded that the state
pesticide statute was intended by the Wisconsin legislature to protect people, plants
and animals from injuries from economic poisons in a manner more protective than
that afforded by the common law.' Accordingly, the Bennett court held that the
statute created a duty of due care for pesticide users to follow directions on pesticide
labels in applying pesticides; failure to carry out that duty was negligence per se.88
4. Emergence of "Toxic Tort" Theories of Recovery for PersonalInjuries From
Exposure to Pesticides
The recent emergence of the generic field of "toxic torts" 9 presents the potential
that Pesticide Driftmakers may be held liable for wrongfully exposing humans to low
levels of pesticides which ultimately cause personal injuries, diseases, or death. Tort
recovery for personal injuries occasioned by exposure to pesticides has been
theoretically possible for several years under the analytical rubric of "drenching
cases." "Drenching cases have been brought against [pesticide] applicators as well
as manufacturers and sellers" in situations "in which an individual suffers serious
injury after exposure to a large amount of pesticides in a very short period of time
and in a manner not intended by the manufacturer."' The 1961 Mississippi case of
Lawler v. Skelton9' is a prototypical "drenching case." As explained by other
commentators:
In Lawler, the plaintiff presented substantial evidence that defendant's
contractor, who was spraying a cotton crop with a mixture of malathion
and endrin, oversprayed and released the pesticides over the cotton gin
where plaintiff was working. It was undisputed that if a person receives
an excessive amount of those chemicals, they can be highly toxic and
dangerous to human life; the container labels, as well as a government

85. 348 N.W.2d 540 (Wis. 1984).
86. Id. at 548 (quoting Wis. STAT. § 94.71 (1975)).
87. Id.
88. Bennett, 348 N.W.2d at 549; cf.J.L. Wilson Farms, Inc. v. Wallace, 590 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1979) (upholding admission of evidence that defendants failed to comply with regulation
requiring state authorization of commercial aerial application of pesticides and notice of spraying).
89. See generally G.W. BOSTON & M. STUART MADDEN, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND ToXIc
TORTS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (1994) (the first casebook devoted exclusively to toxic torts);
Robert F. Blomquist, American Toxic Tort Law: An HistoricalBackground, 1979-87, PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 85 (1992) (collecting cases and conceptually tracing the early history of American toxic tort law
up to the middle part of the 1980s); Robert F. Blomquist, Emerging Themes and Dilemmas in American
Toxic Tort Law 1988-91: A Legal-Historicaland PhilosophicalExegesis, 18 S. ILL. L.J. I(1993); Robert
F. Blomquist, An Introductionto American Toxic Tort Law: Three OverarchingMetaphors and Three
Sources of Law, 26 VAL. U.L. REV. 795 (1992).
90. Brett & Potter, supra note 20, at 403.
91. 130 So. 2d 565 (Miss. 1961).
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aeronautics safety manual, reflected that endrin and malathion are
dangerous to humans exposed by skin contact, inhalation or swallowing.
Immediately after the spraying, the plaintiff became dizzy and nauseated,
the next day his temperature rose and he went into a coma. In subsequent months he suffered various illnesses.
The court determined that the great weight of the evidence supported
the conclusion that the contractor sprayed the plaintiff with a chemical
mixture and that the spraying was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs
immediate acute illness.'
When a victim suffers acute symptoms shortly after intensive exposure to a toxic
pesticide, "courts have [found] little hesitation in finding liability on the part of the
applicator or other responsible party who could have prevented the heavy expo93
sure."
In contradistinction, low level personal injury exposure cases, while theoretically
available against Pesticide Driftmakers, 9' are extremely difficult to prove. This
difficulty of proof stems from practical problems encountered by toxic tort plaintiffs
in detecting injury at the time of exposure to pesticide drift and in linking clinical
symptoms to exposure!' Absent judicial or legislative relaxation of proof standards
in the future, it is unlikely that many plaintiffs will be able to establish tort liability
against Pesticide Driftmakers for chronic personal injuries from low level exposure
to pesticides.
III. Some Tentative Thoughts Toward Reconceptualizing Liabilityfor Pesticide
Driftmakers
A. Synthesis of the Preexisting Liability Paradigm
The preexisting liability paradigm for Pesticide Driftmakers is at war with itself,
causing considerable uncertainties and transaction costs, without providing sufficient
incentives to prevent unnecessary pesticide use by farmers. On the one hand, a line
of cases assumes that pesticides can be applied safely and without cross-boundary
spillover effects to neighbors' crops, livestock and persons. On the other hand, a

92. Brett & Potter, supra note 20, at 403-04 (footnote omitted); see also Holladay v. Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 255 F. Supp. 879, 885-86 (S.D. Iowa 1966) (concluding plaintiff's disease
was caused by heavy exposure to pesticides); Tripp v. Choate, 415 S.W.2d 808, 811-12 (Mo. 1967)
(concluding decedent's acute exposure to DDT, as a result of defendant's negligence, caused decedent's

death).
93. Brett & Potter, supra note 18, at 405 (footnote omitted). "These cases like the [Pesticide
Driftmakers] property damage cases, seem to infer causation from the facts of misapplication and damage
similar to that usually associated with exposure to the product and assume wrongdoing when exposure,
causation, and injury are well established." IL (footnote omitted).
94. For various toxic personal injury theories of liability, see generally BOSTON & MADDEN, supra
note 89.
95. Brett & Potter, supranote 18, at 409-21 (discussing practical proof issues in pesticide exposure
cases).
96. Id.
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different set of cases presupposes that pesticide drift from application of agricultural
poisons cannot be safely applied, despite the exercise of due care, because, of
uncontrollable factors such as wind gusts, weather changes, and the physical
characteristics of pesticide droplets or aerosols.
Further uncertainties attend pesticide drift liability rules due to ambiguities in the
language and interpretation of the abnormally dangerous activity provisions of
sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In addition, the judiciary
has used expansive, but vague, negligence principles in formulating the duty of care
for Pesticide Driftmakers. There are also emerging differences in the willingness of
courts to find causation. In crop or livestock damage cases causation is freely
inferred. However, courts have been hesitant to find causation in recent pesticide
exposure toxic tort actions involving personal injury. Moreover, state liability regimes
addressing damages caused by Pesticide Driftmakers are clouded by an interlocking
set of federal regulatory rules, practices and programs which serve to directly
encourage unsustainable agricultural pesticide use, while indirectly discouraging
alternative agricultural practices which seek to minimize pesticide usage.'
B. An Outline of a Proposalfor Reconceptualizing Liability
(1) In a comprehensive and insightful 1989 report, entitled Alternative Agriculture,"' the National Research Council made a number of conclusions about the

97. As pointed out in a recent government report:
A wide range of federal policies, including commodity programs, trade policy, research
and extension programs, food grading and cosmetic standards, pesticide regulation, water
quality and supply policies, and tax policy, significantly influence farmers' choices of
agricultural practices. As a whole, federal policies work against environmentally benign
practices and the adoption of alternative agricultural systems, particularly those involving
crop rotations, certain soil conservation practices, reductions in pesticide use, and
increased use of biological and cultural means of pest control. These policies have
generally made a plentiful food supply a higher priority than protection of the resource
base.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ALTERNATIvE AGRICULTURE 6 (1989) [hereinafter ALTERNATIVE
AGRICULTURE].
98. Id. The background for the National Research Council's report is set forth in the preface to the
book as follows:

The 1980s have been a time of change in U.S. agriculture. The financial viability of many
farms and rural communities declined during the mid-1980s as crop prices and land values
fell. More than 200,000 farms went bankrupt. Since 1986, increasing market prices and
exports of major farm commodities have improved the farm economy, but this recovery
would not have been possible without record levels of government support.

The environmental consequences of farming have also become increasingly important
to policymakers, farmers, and the public. The Environmental Protection Agency has
identified agriculture as the largest nonpoint source of water pollution. Pesticides and
nitrates from fertilizers and manures have been found in the groundwater of most states.
The issue of pesticide and antibiotic residues in food remains unsolved. Soil erosion,
salinization, and depletion of aquifers for irrigation are significant problems in some
regions.

In 1984, the Board on Agriculture appointed a committee to study the science and
policies that have influenced the adoption of alternative production systems designed to
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current profligate use of pesticides in American agriculture." The Council also
issued several recommendations regarding needed "changes in commodity and
[federal] regulatory policies [needed] to neutralize their bias against the adoption of
alternative farming systems.""
(2) Changes in federal farm and environmental policy,'' research and development strategy,"~ and agricultural economics and market information dissemination

control these problems. The committee found that many farmers have taken steps to
reduce the costs and adverse environmental effects of their operations, Some have
improved conventional techniques, and others have adopted alternatives.
For the rest of this century, agricultural producers and policymakers will focus on three
goals: (1) keeping U.S. farm exports competitive; (2) cutting production costs; and (3)
reducing the environmental consequences of farming. The committee's report examines
the scientific and economic viability of alternative systems that can help farmers and
policymakers achieve these goals.
Id. at v-vi.
99. Examples of some of the conclusions about national agricultural pesticide use in the National
Research Council's repoit are as follows:
Many federal policies discourage adoption of alternative practices and systems by
economically penalizing those who adopt rotations, apply certain soil conservation
systems, or attempt to reduce pesticide applications. Federal programs often tolerate and
sometimes encourage unrealistically high yield goals, inefficient fertilizer and pesticide
use, and unsustainable use of land and water. Many farmers in these programs manage
their farms to maximize present and future program benefits, sometimes at the expense
of environmental quality.
Fertilizers and pesticides are often applied at rates that cannot be justified
economically without consideration of present or future farm program payments.
...Federal grading standards, or standards adopted under federal marketing orders,
often discourage alternative pest control practices for fruits and vegetables by imposing
cosmetic and insect-part criteria that have little if any relation to nutritional quality.

Current federal pesticide regulatory policy applies a stricter standard to new
pesticides and pest control technologies than to currently used older pesticides approved
before 1972. This policy exists in spite of the fact that a small number of currently used
pesticides appear.; to present the vast majority of health and environmental risks associated
with pesticides. This policy inhibits the marketing of biologically based or genetically
engineered products and safer pesticides that may enhance opportunities for alternative
agricultural production systems.
Id. at 10, 12-13 (emphasis omitted).
100. Id. at 17.
Federal commodtty programs must be restructured to help farmers realize the full benefits
of the productiwty gains possible through many alternative practices. These practices
include wider adoption of rotations with legumes and nonleguminous crops, the continued
use of improved cultivars, IPM and biological pest control, disease-resistant livestock,
improved farm machinery, lower-cost management strategies that use fewer off-farm and
synthetic chemical inputs, and a host of alternative technologies and management systems.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
101. Id. at 17-20.
102. Ild.
at 20-22.
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practices"°3 to provide incentives for farmers to adopt more environmentally benign
agricultural practices are necessary, but not sufficient, to more efficiently and
effectively prevent future crop, livestock and personal injuries from pesticide drift,
while lowering transaction costs due to uncertainties in the liability regime.
(3) A fundamental shift from the current drift-control liability scheme of ambiguous state tort principles to a future drift-prevention approach (with theoretically lower
transaction costs) requires the legislative reinvention of pesticide drift liability rules
at the state level. In this regard, four key transitional legislative rule changes would
be advisable. First, by preparation and implementation of a state-approved "best
agricultural practices" plan - including integrated pest management (IPM) measures,
crop rotations, and genetic improvement of crops to resist pests and diseases and to
use nutrients more effectively. Compliance with the plan would immunize farmers
and certified pesticide applicators whom they hired from pesticide drift tort suits for
crop and livestock damage to neighbors.0" Second, a "Drift Compensation Fund"
103. Id. at 22-23.
104. Compare the EPA's recently initiated Pesticide Environmental Stewardship Program (PESP).
As described in a recent EPA publication:
EPA has launched its first pesticide voluntary partnership for pollution prevention. The
Pesticide Environmental Stewardship Program (PESP), is dedicated to protecting human
health and preserving the environment by reducing both the use of pesticides and the risks
associated with pesticide use. The partnership is a key element in the PESP, which is
sponsored by EPA, USDA, and FDA. Current partners ... include agricultural growers
as well as non-agricultural interests, such as utility companies who use pesticides on their
right-of-ways.
Partners in PESP agree to develop and implement an environmental stewardship plan
tailored to their own pesticide usage. They also agree to use the safest, most effective pest
management practices available.
In turn, EPA provides a liaison to assist the partner in developing comprehensive,
achievable goals. Liaisons also act as "customer service representatives" for EPA,
providing the partner with access to information and personnel. EPA also promises to
integrate the partners' stewardship plans into its agricultural policies and programs. EPA
has also provided some grant dollars to some of the charter partners.
So far, grower groups have committed to a number of projects, including conducting
more research into IPM techniques, developing computer prediction models for more
precise pesticide applications, educating their members and the public regarding pesticide
use, and working with equipment manufacturers to fine-tune application techniques.
Examples include:
The American Corn Growers will be promoting and expanding its "bottomline" corn growing contest, which seeks to maximize a grower's profit from corn
production while reducing production in puts such as pesticides.
The California Pear Growers and California Pear Advisory Board are funding - through grower and processor check-offs - the Pear Pest Management
Research Fund and research into safer pest management techniques.
o The California Citrus Board has committed $750,000 to research into safer
pest control.
' A consortium of East Coast and Midwest utilities is training their pesticide
users in techniques to lower risks from pesticide application.
PESP was announced in December 1994 and grows out of the commitment made by EPA,
USDA and FDA in joint testimony before Congress in September 1993 to develop
commodity-specific initiatives to reduce the use and risks of pesticides.
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should be established and administered within the state department of agriculture.
Reasonable application fees from farmers submitting "best agricultural practices"
plans, pesticide applicator license fees, and a sliding scale agricultural pesticides sales
tax and use tax - varying in percentage based on the relative hazardousness of the
pesticide - would finance the "Drift Compensation Fund.""°5 The administrator of
the Drift Compensation Fund would be authorized to pay economic damages - up
to a possible cap level of several thousand dollars - for crop and livestock damage
supported by substantial credible administrative evidence and linked to pesticide drift
from a farmer with an approved "best agricultural practices" plan in place at the time
of the occurrence of the alleged drift damages. Third, tort suits against farmers
without approved "best agricultural practices" plans at the time of neighbors' driftinduced crop or livestock damage claims, and against agricultural pesticide
applicators, would be subject to liability in the courts as determined by preexisting
state tort liability rules. Fourth, "toxic tort" suits against Pesticide Driftmakers
seeking to recover for personal injuries for physical exposure to pesticides would be
determined by the courts pursuant to preexisting tort liability rules. Too much
uncertainty exists at the present time regarding the extent and total amount of
potential toxic tort suits from pesticide exposure to establish a no-fault administrative
mechanism similar to the one proposed for crop and livestock damages.
Conclusion
Throughout this century, liability for agricultural Pesticide Driftmakers has been
governed by an anmalgamation of ambiguous and confusing tort principles. As we
approach the next century, federal regulatory changes which would seek to provide
incentives for alternative agriculture, coupled with state legislative liability and
compensation innovations to encourage farmers to minimize pesticide usage, would
help to clarify the law governing Pesticide Driftmakers. Moreover, this administrative
approach would tend to lower transaction costs for resolving disputes involving crop
and livestock damages from pesticide drift.

U.S. ENvM. PROTECtiON AGENCY, POLLUTION PREVENTION NEWS 3 (1995).

105. The idea of a tax on hazardous pesticide sales stems from Alan Newman, Ranking Pesticides
By Environmental Impact, 29 ENvTL. SC. & TECH. 324A, 325A (1995).
[William Pease of the School of Public Health at the University of California-Berkeley]
and his collaborators have proposed a California pesticide tax to fund state programs for
environmental protection and integrated pest management which, for example, could be
tied to a hazard ranking system. In practice, this pesticide tax would mirror current federal
taxes on chlorofluorocarbon alternatives that make environmentally safer
chlorofluorocaibon alternatives more economically attractive. However, such a pesticide
tax would require some scientific consensus on the appropriate model, which doesn't now
exist.
Id. at 325A.
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